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Across various fields it is argued that the self in part consists of an autobiographical self-narrative and 
that the self-narrative has an impact on agential behavior. Similarly, within action theory, it is claimed 
that the intentional structure of coherent long-term action is divided into a hierarchy of distal, 
proximal, and motor intentions. However, the concrete mechanisms for how narratives and distal 
intentions are generated and impact action is rarely fleshed out concretely. We here demonstrate how 
narratives and distal intentions can be generated within cognitive agents and how they can impact 
agential behavior over long time scales. We integrate narratives and distal intentions into the LIDA 
model,and demonstrate how they can guide agential action in a manner that is consistent with the 
Global Workspace Theory of consciousness. This paper serves both as an addition to the LIDA 
cognitive architecture and an elucidation of how narratives and distal intention emerge and play their 
role in cognition and action 
Keywords: LIDA; Global Workspace Theory; Narrative; Action Theory; Intentions; Distal 
Intentions; Agency.
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What separates agential action from mere behavior? When examined over a short period 
of time, autonomous agents and non-autonomous agents often produce behaviors that are 
similar in execution and outcome. For example, we can imagine an autonomous agent and 
a non-autonomous agent that can both pick up objects and put them in a trash can. However, 
a key difference emerges between the two since the actions of autonomous agents stem 
from an agenda. In order to carry out their agenda, autonomous agents must have a control 
structure that perpetually helps them answer the question: what do I do next? [Franklin, 
1995, p. 16]. While fairly simplistic agents can act in accordance with their agenda on a 
moment-to-moment basis, more complex agents such as human beings have agendas that 
include aims that can only be fulfilled over time: what in the action theory literature has 
been dubbed our distal intentions [Mylopoulos & Pacherie, 2018a; Pacherie, 2006, 2008]. 
Saving for a house or training to become a great poet requires ordering one’s actions in a 
fashion that is aimed at the distal future. For complex agents, agential action is 
characterized by setting and pursuing distal intentionsa. This means that complex 
autonomous agency is characterized in part by the ability to construct, follow, and adhere 
to long-term goals. 
While very simple autonomous agents might not need distal intentions to pursue their 
agenda, complicated agents such as human beings may need nested structures of intentions. 
If such structures were not in place, we would have to renegotiate our major life choices 
and aims on a daily or even moment-to-moment basis. Distal intentions are forward looking 
intentions that contain a self-commitment. It is precisely because they contain such self-
commitment that distal intentions have inertia – they are not easily changed or broken 
[Bratman, 1987]. While it is true that agents sometimes set distal intentions without 
committing to them, genuine distal intentions do structure behavior. For example, a 
person’s hedonistic love of Philly cheesesteaks would simply win every time they are 
hungry if they were not able to construct and adhere to intentions such as “I want to get a 
six-pack,” or “I want to compete in the fall triathlon.” To avoid hedonistic behavior, 
autonomous agency and coherent action require the setting and following of distal 
intentions. Importantly, deliberate action is not just about juggling values from moment-
to-moment, but also about adhering to one’s own long-term goals.   
Furthermore, much research has shown that in human agents, autonomy, the self, and 
personal identity are intimately tied to a self-narrative. We humans continually create, 
update, and follow narratives about ourselves with which to make sense of the world and 
our own actions [Bruner, 1991, 2004; Dings, 2019; Hutto, 2008; MacIntyre, 2013; Ryan et 
al., 2019; Schechtman, 1996, 2014]. Our self-narratives and our intentions exist in a 
multicausal relationship to guide and structure our lives and our actions. Without intentions 
 
a In this paper, we use the word intention as it is used in the philosophical literature on action theory. In 
common English, the word ‘intention’ implies commitment. As we will see, in the technical, philosophical 
sense, there is a difference between intentions and intentions that have been committed to.  
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and self-narratives, many instances of volitional decision-making would end in stifled 
indecision. For complex agents such as ourselves, there is a causal relationship between 
the stories we create about ourselves and our conduct in the world. The kinds of stories 
relevant to our discussion in this paper are causal stories, namely stories that order typically 
temporally-distant events into a causal order. Self-narratives not only provide a sense of 
who the agent is, but do so by organizing important life events into a causal order.     
While action theory can be traced back to the very early beginnings of recorded 
philosophy, very few action philosophers have said much about how the structure of 
intentional action is immersed into the structure of functional consciousness. Authors such 
as Anscombe [1979], Davidson [1985], Goldman [1970], Mele [1992], and Bratman [1987, 
2004] have provided cognitive accounts of how action is structured and carried out, but 
these ignore the functional roles of consciousness and the cognitive cycle. How does the 
intention-action framework fit in with the cognitive structure of consciousness?  
Further, while various disciplines are rife with discussion regarding the role of self-
narratives in identity and cognition, these debates tend to happen at a fairly abstract level 
of explanation. In fact, very few have provided concrete explanations for how self-
narratives are generated, stored, utilized, and impact agential behavior. Thus, this paper is 
not only an addition to the LIDA model, it also fills a gap by providing a very concrete 
model for how narratives and intentions support cognition. 
In this paper, we apply the three tiered structure of intention, distal, proximal, and 
motor intention [Mylopoulos & Pacherie, 2018b; Pacherie, 2006, 2008] and narrative 
identity [Schechtman, 2014] to the study of functional consciousness through the LIDA 
model [Franklin et al., 2016]. We show how the LIDA model can provide a systems-level 
account of narrative identity and the intentions that structure action through the cognitive 
cycle. While we will touch upon proximal and motor intentions, most of this paper will 
focus on narratives and distal intentions. Further, it is important to note for those readers 
not familiar with the philosophical debates on “intention”, that the notions of “intentions” 
and “intending” are much broader than how they are used in quotidian language. 
Intentional action refers to the embodied and cognitive processes that make agential action 
structured as opposed to random or reactive movements. So far, the LIDA model literature 
has mostly addressed processes occurring over a single cognitive cycle. This paper will 
provide an addition to the LIDA model that begins to sketch how LIDA agents act 
coherently over multiple cognitive cycles.  
The LIDA model is an embodied approach to the system-level modeling of cognition. 
The LIDA model should, in principle, be able to satisfy both more radical embodied 
approaches to cognition as well as more traditional cognitivist approaches. The point here 
is that the LIDA model does not make any commitments to how the underlying mechanism 
of phenomenal consciousness is produced in brains, computers, or elsewhere.b While the 
LIDA model aims to be compatible with neuroscience, it makes no claims about its 
physical implementation in brains. That being said, LIDA agents are still conceptualized 
 
b See Franklin et al. [2013] for a list of LIDA commitments. 
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as embodied, embedded in their environments, and always in the business of figuring out 
what to do next. To answer the question “what do I do next”, intentions, distal intentions, 
and self-narratives are all connected through the cognitive cycle, to produce coherent 
agential actions over long time scales. 
In the past, the LIDA model has used the terminology of ‘options’ and ‘goals’ to 
capture the intentional nature of action. In this paper, to remain consistent with the 
literature on agential action in cognitive science and action theory, we use the term 
‘intention.’ For the reader already familiar with the LIDA model, an intention is a goal. 
Additionally, and importantly for this paper, a distal intention is an agent’s goal that cannot 
be immediately fulfilled. Generally speaking, we use the words ‘goal’ and ‘intention’ 
synonymously.      
 What is LIDA? 
The LIDA model is a systems-level cognitive architecture developed to model minds, 
whether human, animal, or artificial. LIDA is composed of multiple, mostly asynchronous 
modules, but makes no commitments to the modularity of underlying brain structures. 
Rather, LIDA explains, at the systems-level (or what some philosophers call ‘mid-level’ 
explanation), the structures at work in cognition and consciousness, and their interactions 
through each cognitive cycle. 
One of the core notions is that “minds” are control structures for autonomous agents  
[Franklin, 1995; Franklin & Graesser, 1997]. Minds can be implemented in biological 
bodies, artificial bodies, or computers. The form of body does not matter, as long as the 
mind functions as a control structure allowing the agent to pursue its agenda. Minds are 
always in the business of answering the perpetual question “what should I do next?” The 
answer to such a question highly depends on the agent’s constitution – e.g., is it embodied, 
what kind of environment is it embedded within, and what is its overarching agenda? The 
LIDA model can account for some agents whether they are embodied or non-embodied 
agents (for example, biological agents such as humans, animals or robots, versus software 
agents that do not have a body in the conventional sense). For an account of how software 
agents can be embodied see [Franklin, 1997]. Regardless, as long as we are dealing with 
an autonomous agent, the mind of the agent cannot be divorced from its agenda.  
 Furthermore, the LIDA model is committed to action and cognition being smoothly 
integrated. Cognition happens through rolling, overlapping cycles in which the agent 
samples and acts on its environment. While most modules operate asynchronously, the 
broadcasts coming from the Global Workspace unfold in serial order to guarantee the 
coherent unfolding of consciousness. Additionally, Action Selection also operates 
synchronously and guarantees the coherent choice of actions. The sequential order of 
broadcasts aids the agent in selecting and executing actions that fit with the causal 
unfolding of events outside the agent. While most modules continually carry out their own, 
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independent functions, the sequential order of the broadcasts ensures that agents will act 
cohesively.       
Importantly, the LIDA model is based on the Global Workspace Theory of 
consciousness [Baars, 1988, 1997, 2019]. Consciousness is included in ongoing cognitive 
cycles, in which each cycle is one cognitive moment or atom. Cognition consist of cycles 
of recurring events, wherein the rapid nature of the cycles create the fluidity of conscious 
experience (at an estimated ~10Hz in humans) [Madl et al., 2011]. Each cycle is a very 
rapid cognitive moment in which the agent perceives the environment, attends to that 
environment, and finally chooses an action (for humans, all within roughly 200-500 
milliseconds). The cognitive cycle is divided into three overarching phases: an 
understanding phase, an attending phase, and an action selection/learning phase. In LIDA 
learning (updating of the modules) can take place across most modules with each and every 
cognitive cycle [Kugele & Franklin, forthcoming].  
At the beginning of each cognitive cycle, the agent’s Current Situational Model (CSM) 
in the pre-conscious Workspace is updated (Fig. 1). Special-purpose processors called 
‘attention codelets’ will monitor the CSM for relevant structures, and bring those structures 
to the Global Workspace. Each attention codelet has its own particular concern. That is, 
each scans the CSM for structures that best match its specific, narrow concerns. The best-
matching structures are brought from the CSM to the Global Workspace where they 
compete to become the content of the conscious broadcast. 
Coalitions are formed containing attention codelets and various structures. When 
attention codelets find structures of interest to them in the CSM, they can bring those 
structures to the coalition-forming process. Here the structures are formed into full 
coalitions with a combined total activation, and can now compete for consciousness as one 
object within the Global Workspace. Whatever coalition is the most salient (i.e., has the 
most activation) wins the competition for consciousness, and its content is broadcast 
globally across the model to almost every module. Often, it is the brightest, loudest, or 
most urgent structure that wins the competition for conscious broadcast.  With each 
broadcast, all memory modules can be updated, that is they can learn. After most 
broadcasts, an action selection process is initiated. Perception and action are intimately 
connected because almost every cognitive cycle leads to some action even if that action is 
minute or internal.  
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For an overview of the LIDA model see Fig. 1. The cognitive cycle begins to the left 
with incoming internal and external sensory stimuli, and proceeds roughly clockwise 
around the model. 
 
 The Narrative Self and Action Selection 
Several authors have suggested that what characterizes the self is the agent’s ability to 
create, from its own experiences, a coherent life narrative. Simultaneously, cognitive 
science, phenomenology, psychology, anthropology, and numerous other fields have 
suggested and specified various aspects of the self (e.g., sense of agency, sense of 
ownership, preconscious self, minimal self, bodily self, habitual self, and many more). 
Rather than arguing that the narrative self is the true self, we argue that what we call the 
self is the interplay between many dynamically interacting parts, or what Gallagher [2013] 
has called a ‘pattern theory of the self.’ The pattern theory of the self has previously been 
incorporated into the LIDA model, including the autobiographical self and the narrative 
self [Ryan et al., 2019]. The important point here is that several factors shape the way 
agents experience themselves as a self, from the constitution of our bodies, the structure of 
perception, the structure of our memory systems, to the cultural niches we live in. One 
Fig. 1. Overview of the LIDA Model 
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product of this list of features is the constant construction of a coherent self-narrative 
[Dennett, 1992; Schechtman, 1996, 2014]. The self is not a singular thing, but rather 
emerges from various biological and perceptual processes, which create a coherent self-
narrative. From this, we experience ourselves as characters in a story automatically written 
by us. While many authors have developed versions of the narrative self, the core idea is 
that temporally the “self” is constituted by a coherent narrative structured from the agent’s 
memories, beliefs, affect, and bodily capacities [Schechtman, 2014]. Such a narrative not 
only provides the agent with an existential answer to the question “who am I?,” but more 
importantly also aids the agent in smoothly understanding and maneuvering in its 
environment. Hence, a coherent self-narrative is important for knowledge, perception, and 
action selection. 
In elucidating the self, the LIDA model distinguishes between the self-concept and the 
narrative self. Although having similarities, these two aspects of self serve different 
functions. Self-concepts include attitudes, beliefs, memories, and emotions related to 
oneself, among other things. They represent how the agent currently takes itself to be. For 
example, an agent might believe that it is a charming person, that it is healthy, or that it 
once went on a TV game show and won. The narrative self, on the other hand, explains 
why an agent did what they did [Ryan et al., 2019]. In other words, the narrative self is 
concerned with temporality and causality. Self-narratives provide agents with an 
understanding of why they acted as they did.  
Furthermore, self-narratives aid agents in understanding and acting on their 
environments and by providing background reasons for intention-setting. For example, 
when faced with the choice of continuing to pursue a difficult aim, an agent can rely on 
their self-narrative. “Should I continue pursuing this difficult aim?” “Yes: I am the kind of 
person who gets stuff done no matter the obstacle;” or no, “I am a downtrodden victim of 
society’s systemic injustices.” Here both the hero and victim characterizations can be 
extended into a longer, coherent narrative incorporating the agent’s memories. Unlike 
simple sequential organization, a narrative organizes an agent’s memory in terms of 
importance and causality. That is, narratives tell us which life events are important to us 
and how these events impact later significant events. In this way, narratives also aid in the 
action-selection process, especially when it comes to deliberation.   
Readers and critics of self-narrative theories often misunderstand the notion, because 
they assume that we are always consciously aware of, and volitionally adding to, our 
narratives. However, the notion of a self-narrative should not be understood in such a 
strong sense. Rather, Schectman [2014, p. 100] argues that self-narratives are mostly 
implicit, and in LIDA terms, preconscious. For Schectman, as well as LIDA, the agent’s 
self-narrative mostly operates at the sub-personal level but can, if needed, be brought to 
consciousness. However, most of the time self-narratives function as a holistic structure 
that shapes how we experience, categorize, and act on future events. For example, in LIDA, 
an agent’s feelings and desires can augment its options differently depending on whether 
the agent takes themselves to be a “the person who gets stuff done” or “the tragic victim of 
a cruel universe.”  
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In this way, the LIDA model can explain how narratives can make previously opaque 
insights explicitly aware to the agent. In LIDA, through a stream of cognitive cycles, a 
narrative is generated via mostly sub-personal processes. However, being stored in the 
agent’s memory systems parts of the narrative, when promoted the right way, can be called 
to consciousness. Through mostly sub-personal processing, the LIDA model preserves the 
insight that agents generate self-narratives while most times being unaware of the self-
narrative.   
There often is a consistent, self-reinforcing feedback loop between the narrative 
schemata an agent has constructed for themselves, and their choices and experiences. For 
example, the agent who has constructed a pessimistic “tragic victim” narrative will focus 
on negative experience, and generally cast their experiences in a negative light, thereby 
reinforcing their self-narrative. Similarly, more positive-oriented narratives tend to cast 
perceptual experience in a more positive light, and to generate choices that reinforce the 
positive narrative.   
Self-narratives not only aid in creating a temporally-coherent experience of oneself, 
they also assist in structuring action selection. In particular, deliberative action selection is 
determined not only by our distal intentions, but also by our personal narratives. For 
example, the question of whether to use one’s disposable income this month on concert 
tickets, or to put it into savings for a new car, is not simply a cost-benefit analysis. The 
agent may very well think that the concert is as “beneficial” to their life as adding a little 
extra to the car savings fund. The question to save or splurge becomes a larger question of 
how these purchases fit into the agent’s self-narrative. “Am I the kind of person who values 
this type of experience more than savings?” Rather than simply engaging in utilitarian cost-
benefit analysis to obtain coherent structured action, agents must often consult their self-
narrative. In LIDA, we use an updated ideomotor theory [James, 1890/2007] to account for 
the role of narratives in action selection. As we will see (Sec. 4.4), narratives partake in the 
ideomotor process by providing the agent with supporters and objectors.   
MacIntyre [2013] elucidates how the structure of behavior is dependent on intentions, 
and how intentions are, in turn, dependent on self-narratives. In line with prominent figures 
in action theory [Anscombe, 1979; Davidson, 1985; Grice, 1972], MacIntyre points out 
that any action can be described in any number of ways. For example, when we see a man 
doing something in the backyard, is he “gardening,” “exercising,” “pleasing his spouse,” 
or some other activity? [MacIntyre, 2013, p. 206]. To figure out the man’s intentions, it is 
not enough to have a physical description of what he is doing; rather, we must know the 
context within which the man is performing the action. In other words, to understand 
agential action we need to understand the narrative within which the action is embedded. 
For example, a young boy robot-dancing at a bus stop seems unintelligible without any 
background. However, if we know that the boy has made it his life’s mission to become 
internet famous because his teacher told him he would never amount to anything, then the 
spectacle becomes intelligible. As Macintyre puts it,   
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We cannot, that is to say, characterize behavior independently of intentions, and 
we cannot characterize intentions independently of the settings which make those 
intentions intelligible both to agents themselves and to others [MacIntyre, 2013, 
p. 206] 
 
Macintyre’s point is that intelligible action exists in frameworks where short-term 
intentions cohere with long-term intentions in a network that adds up to a narrative. Why 
is the man gardening? Because he intends to surprise his spouse. He intends to do so 
because he wants to continue their happy marriage, and the happy marriage is a happy one 
exactly because of key actions and intentions that came before it. Why is the boy pretending 
to be a robot at the bus stop? In the hope that someone will film his behavior and put it on 
the internet. Intelligible actions exist in such a way that they form a temporal and causal 
story. MacIntyre provides a fun and apt example:   
 
If in the middle of my lecture on Kant’s ethics I suddenly broke six eggs into a 
bowl and added flour and sugar, proceeding all the while with my Kantian 
exegesis, I have not, simply in virtue of the fact that I was following a sequence 
prescribed by Fanny Farmer, performed an intelligible action [MacIntyre, 2013, 
p. 209]. 
 
We see then that actions are opaque to others and ourselves unless we understand 
intentions as embedded into narratives. To understand the actions of an agent, we need to 
understand which of the many possible intentions that led to their action is the primary 
intention. But primary intentions are only those that make sense when coherently 
embedded into a narrative. For the man gardening because he wants to continue the happy 
marriage, the short-term intentions to pick up the shovel and to dig in a certain location are 
only intelligible considering the history of the marriage. Cracking six eggs into a bowl 
during a Kant lecture is not an intelligible action unless we can create a coherent narrative 
of intentions, events, and contexts that led up to the act. In this way, we see that part of 
what it means to be an autonomous agent is to be the author of one’s actions. To make 
sense of our own actions and the actions of others, we are expected to be legible. 
At this point we have seen how there is a deeply coherent structure in place between 
self-narratives and our actions. Furthermore, we have seen that intentions are important for 
understanding, individuating, and causing agential action. A multi-tiered structure is now 
in place in which self-narrative aids in setting and adjusting distal intentions. In turn, distal 
intentions structure the setting of short-term intentions and the execution of actions 
[Bratman, 1987, 2007]. However, as agents go through the world acting on their 
environments, new experiences, memories, and skills also update their intentions, and self-
narratives. Narratives, intentions, and experience exist in both top-down and bottom-up 
causal relationships. 




In action theory, the relationship between high-level, narrative-based intending and 
our moment-to-moment actions is captured by Pacherie’s DPM model – distal intentions, 
proximal intentions, and motor intentions[Mylopoulos & Pacherie, 2018b; Pacherie, 2006, 
2008]. Distal intentions (D-intentions) are the far-reaching intentions that organize our 
lives over long time scales (e.g., I want to get a Ph.D., or I am getting the house ready for 
next winter). Proximal intentions (P-intentions) are mid-range intentions (e.g., I intend to 
make cereal, or I intend to pick up the paint can in the garage).  In Pacherie’s model 
proximal intentions typically contain concrete instructions for physical action. In contrast, 
in LIDA those instructions are contained within motor intentions. In the DPM model motor 
intentions (M-intentions) are short-term intentions during action that guide the execution 
of action (e.g., I intend to close my hand at this specific angle to catch the ball). These 
intentions form a causal hierarchy which is at play whenever an agent acts in the world 
[Mylopoulos & Pacherie, 2018b]. 
 
 
Fig. 2. The coherence relationship between levels invovled in agential action. An agent’s self narrative aids in 
creating its distal intentions (its long term goals). In turn, distal intentions help steer more immediate action 
plans and action execution. When all goes well, there is a coherent, transitive relationship between an agent’s 
most immediate actions and their self-understanding. Furthermore, as  agents interacts with the world, their self-
narrative and distal intentions might change accordingly. In this way, agents and their environments perpetually 
transform one another. 
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While the general gist of the DPM model maps well onto the LIDA model, the LIDA 
model divides some of the intentional processes into finer granularity (see Fig. 3). For 
example, as we will see M-intentions are divided into two modules and processes (Sensory 
Motor Memory and Motor Plan Execution) and similarly P-intentions, our everyday 
immediate actions, are divided into two processes and two modules (Procedural Memory 
and Action Selection). Hence, the biggest mapping difference between the DPM model 
and LIDA, regards P-intentions. In the DPM model our everyday P-intentions (making 
cereal or putting on the green shirt) contain instructions on how to do the action. In contrast, 
as we will see, in LIDA instructions for how to do an action is captured in Sensory Motor 
Memory which chooses motor plan templates and instantiate those into a motor plan (see 
Sec. 4).  
In LIDA, P-intentions are mediated by consciousness. This means that P-intentions 
come about when Procedural Memory uses content from the conscious broadcast to 
instantiate behavior schemes and then send them off to Action Selection in a behavior 
stream. In the stream each scheme contains variables for a context, an action, and an 
expected result. For example one scheme might contain “From the clothes pile on the chair, 
pick up green shirt, resulting in having a shirt available in hand.” The very next scheme in 
the stream might contain “In the bedroom holding a shirt, put shirt over your head and pull 
it on, resulting in having a shirt on.” We see then, that the P-intention to “put on the shirt” 
contains a series of behaviors each of which must be selected. Thus, P-intention is the 
Fig. 3. The figure shows the overlap between terminology from Pacherie’s DPM model and its corresponding 
modules, and processes in the LIDA model. Note that the LIDA model separates D-Intentions, P-intentions and 
M-intentions into sub-modules and processes. Thus, the LIDA model operates at a higher level of explanatory 
granularity than typical action theory. 
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process in which a stream of instantiated schemes (what we call behaviors) is sent from 
Procedural Memory to Action Selection, which must then pick the most appropriate 
behavior given the situation (we will explain this process in more detail in Sec. 4.3). 
Importantly, while the DPM model speaks of “a” proximal intention as a single item, in 
LIDA P-intentions are behavior streams across modules. Thus, the intention to “get the 
paint from next door” is in reality a series of behaviors that are sent from Procedural 
Memory to Action Selection. Action Selection then, typically chooses from this series, 
usually in the sequential order in which they were delivered, which actions are to be further 
concretized by Sensory Motor Memory, and then carried into physical movement.  
However, since P-intentions, are streams of behaviors which are chosen behavior by 
behavior in Action Selection, the module can stop choosing behaviors from the behavior 
stream to do something else. For example, if an agent is typing an email, and the doorbell 
rings, the agent does not have to finish carrying out the behavior stream. Rather, the agent 
can go answer the door, and then return to their desk to continue the email writing (since 
the rest of the email writing behaviors from the email behavior stream still linger in Action 
Selection). Thus, the LIDA model captures the flexibility of everyday proximal 
engagement with the world that is often interrupted or augmented on the fly, by separating 
proximal engagement into behavior streams and the action selection process.    
In LIDA to commit to a proximal intention is a distributed process that typically begins 
with an option (Sec. 4.2), and involves Procedural Memory, Act 
ion Selection, and Sensory Motor Memory. Having committed to a P-intention, means 
that some consciously broadcast content has been instantiated into a stream of behaviors, 
and those behaviors are now highly likely to be chosen by Action Selection one by one 
(unless something more pressing emerges in the environment). For example, when the 
agent intends to “go get the paint next door” a series of behaviors such as walking, door 
opening, paint getting might get sent to Action Selection, and are likely being selected and 
executed in sequential order (again, unless something interferes with the process. For 
example, the house cat might jump in the way and demand petting). Thus, proximal 
intentions, rather than being a discrete item, involve a series of processes and modules in 
LIDA (Sec. 4.3). 
In contrast to P-intentions, D-intentions are those intentions that cannot be 
immediately executed and for which a behavior stream typically cannot be created. For 
example, creating a behavior stream for getting paint in the garage is fairly straightforward 
because the agent’s Procedural Memory can reasonably lay out all the behaviors needed to 
go next door and get the paint. However, no such behavior stream can be created for 
“getting a Ph.D.” Getting a Ph.D. is a goal that cannot be fulfilled immediately, and there 
is no concrete stream of behaviors that can lead the agent to that goal. Rather, to be fulfilled, 
the distal intention must be stored in the agent’s memory systems, and be revisited as the 
agent goes through life. An agent can create P-intentions involved with activities such as 
writing papers or signing up for classes, but no single behavior stream can typically fulfill 
a distal intention such as getting a Ph.D. Much of this paper addresses how distal intentions 
can be revisited and help guide agent’s daily behavior.          
Modeling Long-Term Intentions and Narratives       13 
 
As we have seen, action theory tends to conceptualize intentions at a fairly course level 
of granularity. We elaborate on that tradition by taking each kind of intention (D-intention, 
P-intention, M-intention), to be a heuristic for finer grained processes across various 
modules. Intentions then are a shorthand for describing cognitive processes that produce 
structured actions – namely, agential actions.      
Many intentional actions in LIDA agents are mediated by the content broadcast from 
the Global Workspace. However, while consciousness plays a role in distributing content 
to the various modules so they can fulfill their function (for example, selecting schemes, 
instantiating behaviors, selecting motor plan templates, etc.) these processes almost always 
remain unconscious. Thus, the various steps of action selection might not happen in explicit 
awareness. For example, when deeply emerged into a game of tennis, an agent might end 
up performing the “volley” rather than the “forehand” but have no explicit awareness of 
the competition that took place between the “volley” behavior and the “forehand” behavior. 
In contrast, if an agent is playing Chess, they might engage in an explicitly deliberative 
process in which much of it comes to phenomenal awareness (Sec. 4.4).  
In canonical action theory, action has typically been explained mostly in folk 
psychological terms -namely in terms of beliefs and desires [Davidson, 1978, 1985]. 
However, as Bratman points out, beliefs and desires are not enough to form intention and 
steer coherent behavior. For coherent agential action we also need an evaluation that a 
certain course of action is desirable and achievable: "Intentions are, whereas ordinary 
desires are not, conduct-controlling pro-attitudes. Ordinary desires, in contrast, are merely 
potential influencers of action" [Bratman, 1987, p. 15]. For Bratman, having beliefs and 
desires is not sufficient to throw us into action. Rather, we need intentions as controllers of 
conduct. Consequently, unlike beliefs and desires alone, intentions involve a commitment 
to action. 
As we will see in the following sections, the commitment that Bratman speaks of is 
implemented throughout various processes across multiple cognitive cycles. Thus, we 
agree that intentions steer agential behavior through a commitment to the intention. 
However, commitment is an emergent property that takes place across memory, perception, 
and learning processes. In particular, the LIDA model is pledged  to the conscious learning 
hypothesis [Franklin et al., 2016, Sec. 4.5]. Thus, learning takes place through the 
interaction between consciousness and the various memory systems, and the process of 
forming intentions and commitments is no different. Thus, as we will see, the formation of 
narratives, distal intentions, and commitments are all mediated by consciousness.   
Next, we will show how distal, proximal, and motor intentions map onto LIDA’s 
cognitive cycle. Furthermore, we will demonstrate how the hierarchy of narrative and the 
DPM model required for long-term, coherent action is part of the LIDA model. Our 
implementation also captures Bratman’s insight that intentions include commitments. This, 
in turn, will demonstrate how LIDA agents can act coherently over varying time scales. 
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 The Cognitive Cycle – In A Bit More Detail  
The cognitive cycle begins as internal and external stimulation enters Sensory Memory 
(see Fig. 1). This marks the beginning of the “perception and understanding” phase. In 
Sensory Memory, low-level feature detectors begin distinguishing the most rudimentary 
features of the signal. Next, Perceptual Associative Memory (PAM) processes the low-
level features from Sensory Memory into usually more complex entities such as objects, 
categories, relations, events, feelings and emotions. PAM is pivotally important, since a 
large portion of the content of the Current Situational Model (CSM) is composed of 
percepts arriving from PAM. As the CSM updates, cognitive maps can be cued from 
Spatial Memory. Objects and events in the CSM that have been recognized by PAM cue 
episodes from Transient Episodic Memory and from Declarative Memory (itself containing 
autobiographical and semantic memory).  
As the CSM is updated, special-purpose processors called “structure building 
codelets” scan the CSM to create simple or complex structures which amongst other things 
include links between objects, events, and relations. Structure building codelets scan the 
CSM for material relevant to their concerns, and turn that data into structures within the 
CSM. Thus, the rich model of the environment that exists in the CSM (complete with affect, 
memory associations, options, and much more) is perpetually stitched together by structure 
building codelets. When updating the CSM, LIDA utilizes a nodes and link structure 
[Franklin et al., 2016]. For example, the event of my friend buttering some toast consists 
of nodes representing my friend, a butter knife, the butter, and the toast, all connected by 
relation links to the event node. Similar to attention codelets, structure building codelets 
only scan the CSM for material that is useful for the structures they want to build.  
Finally, the preconscious Workspace also contains a Conscious Contents Queue 
(CCQ), keeping track of the most recent conscious broadcasts. This helps the structure 
building codelets create a sense of time and causality [Madl et al., 2015; Snaider et al., 
2012]. For example, using the CCQ, structure building codelets can create causal links 
between events into a temporal causal order.  
So far, we have seen how different memory modules create a rich model of the 
environment and situation within the CSM. However, the Current Situational Model can 
be far too complex for its entirety to be broadcast to the rest of the system. The agent must 
attend to what is most salient and act on that. Hence, we enter the attending phase. To 
figure out what must be consciously broadcast, the agent utilizes attention codelets. The 
attention codelet system is a long-term memory system that can learn with each cognitive 
cycle. Attention codelets each scan the CSM for structures relevant to its concerns, and 
bring those structures to the Global Workspace. Attention codelets can look for very 
general and basic attributes of structures such as being loud, bright, large, dangerous, 
attractive, and so forth. However, given an agent’s specific overarching agenda, goals, and 
expertise, new attention codelets can also be generated to scan for more specific features 
such as “a good Tennis backswing” or “poorly welded iron-rods.” In fact, agents frequently 
generate new attention codelets as they learn, act, and become more attuned with their 
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environment. The competition for consciousness happens not only between physical 
features of objects, but also between features that are modulated by our experiences, 
capacities, and intentions. 
As previously mentioned, attention codelets collaborate to form coalitions that 
compete in the Global Workspace for the spotlight of consciousness. The coalition with 
the highest activation will be the one whose content is broadcast throughout the system. 
When some coalition arrives at the Global Workspace and wins the competition for 
consciousness, the structures carried by the coalition become the content of the broadcast. 
This content is then sent to every module throughout the model. 
 Affective Valence and Incentive Salience  
Cognition is not a neutral calculation; affect, emotion, and incentive play important roles 
in the lives of LIDA cognitive agents. To capture this fact about cognition in LIDA, 
representational parameters such as affective valence (which represents “liking” or 
“disliking”) and incentive salience (which represents “wanting” or “dreading”) can change 
the activation value of a coalition, increasing or decreasing its likelihood of being broadcast 
(see McCall et al. [2020]). In other words, perception and cognition are not motivationally 
neutral, the affective and motivational world of the agent impact what comes to 
consciousness.  
 Structures in the CSM such as objects and events can be attached to activated 
feeling nodes. The activation associated with feeling nodes represents the agent’s 
immediate hedonic “liking or “disliking of the structure in question. The niceness or 
nastiness associated with the feeling is represented through a valence sign attached to the 
feeling node. Here the activation itself represents the intensity of the feeling (how much 
the agent likes or dislikes the thing in question). Valence signs can be either positive or 
negative, for example: 
 
a “hungry” feeling node represents a drive, and has negative valence sign, while 
a “satiated” feeling node also represents a drive but with positive valence sign. A 
“sweet” feeling node represents a perceptual interpretation of some stimulus with 
positive valence sign, while a “bitter” feeling node is similar, but with negative 
valence sign. Intuitively, one may be hungry or satiated in a variety of external 
situations, and one may interpret a variety of different stimuli as sweet or bitter 
[McCall et al., 2020, p. 45]. 
 
The affective valence of a feeling node is determined by the combination of its 
activation value and its valence sign. Complex structures, for example seeing one’s 
childhood home, can contain many feeling nodes, each of which adds to or subtracts from 
the overall affective valence of the structure. 
To illustrate the affective process, we can use the example of a juicy hamburger. In 
LIDA, if the agent in question is embodied, bodily states, such as hunger, thirst, and 
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temperature are monitored using homeostatic receptors. Feeling nodes in PAM can be 
activated based upon these bodily states. In this case, the agent might be experiencing 
hunger, which activates a feeling node with a negative valence sign. However, as a juicy 
hamburger is put on the table, it gets recognized by PAM and a positive feeling node is 
attached to it. Due to the agent’s current state of hunger, the hamburger has a higher 
affective valence and therefore also an overall higher incentive salience.  
In LIDA incentive salience represents the motivational attraction or repulsion, that is, 
the degree of wanting or dreading. Objects have incentive salience because they previously 
have been liked or disliked, or the agent has learned that the object results in positive or 
negative changes in its homeostatic states (such as hunger and thirst). Because the agent 
has liked hamburgers in the past, the hamburger can have a fairly high base-level incentive 
salience. As agents repeatedly come in contact with a given structure, the liking or disliking 
of that experience slowly updates the structure’s base-level incentive salience.  
In our example, because the agent is hungry, the “current incentive salience” is also 
increased. In LIDA current incentive salience is determined by the current state and 
situation that the agent finds itself in. Thus, being in a state of hunger means an increase in 
the hamburgers current incentive salience. The total incentive salience of a structure (such 
as the juicy hamburger) is the base-level and current incentive salience combined. In LIDA, 
many events in the CSM (for example, a hamburger is put on the table) are assigned 
negative or positive incentive salience. This value depends on how much the agent wants 
the event to take place or how much the agent wishes to avoid the event. Many recognized 
events in the CSM have some level of wanting or dreading expressed through incentive 
salience. The role of affective valence and incentive salience becomes important later as 
we look at the role of distal intentions and narratives in structuring long-term action. The 
total incentive salience of a structure (base-level plus current incentive salience) and the 
total activation of that structure (base-level and current activation) contribute to its salience, 
making it more likely to come to consciousness [McCall et al., 2020]. 
 Options 
When elucidating the nature of long-term agential action, it is important to address how an 
agent comes to have options. In the Current Situational Model, structures are labelled either 
“real” or “virtual.” Real content originates from an agent’s sensors, whereas virtual content 
is created internally. For example, dreams, memories, and imaginings are all virtual events. 
One specific kind of virtual event is of interest here, namely options.  
As agents act on and perceive their environments, potentiality for action will be 
perceived in that environment. In LIDA, options are “choice alternatives” constructed as 
virtual events in the CSM. Like all other structures in the CSM, options can have activation 
and incentive salience. Options are generated in the CSM, and brought to the Global 
Workspace for competition by attention codelets. However, unlike simple perceptions of 
objects in the environments, options help guide the action selection process more directly.  
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For example, upon perceiving logs of wood and a fireplace, an option could be 
generated in the CSM that the agent could make a cozy fire. This virtual event might have 
high incentive salience since the event node also might have cued positive childhood 
memories from Declarative Memory. The fact that the virtual feeling-warm event has high 
affective valence in conjunction with the agent being cold may give the event high 
incentive salience. This, in turn, modulates the activation value of the coalition(s) 
containing the option to make a cozy fire.  If a coalition containing the option is brought to 
the Global Workspace, it might win the competition for consciousness. Having broadcast 
the content of the coalition, the option to make a cozy fire, the “learning and action” phase 
begins. As we will see next, when an option has been chosen through a deliberative process, 
the option is transformed into an intention.        
 Action Selection in LIDA 
For the purposes of this paper, how an agent chooses and produces action becomes critical. 
The action selection and learning phase in LIDA roughly corresponds to the proximal and 
motor intentions in the Pacherie’s DPM model. However, as previously mentioned rather 
than intentions being just discrete items, they are also a shorthand for describing processes. 
In the LIDA model, instantiating, selecting, and carrying actions into fruition is a multistep 
process that is typically mediated through a conscious broadcast (with a few exceptions 
such as alarms). The LIDA model employs four types of action selection: volitional, 
consciously mediated, automatized, and alarms. In this paper, we focus mainly on 
volitional action selection and consciously-mediated action selection. For a treatment of 
alarms see [Franklin et al., 2016; McCall et al., 2020]. Furthermore, automatized action 
selection is still being developed in LIDA, and hopefully will be addressed in future papers.   
Once the content of a coalition has been broadcast, the content of that broadcast 
reaches Procedural Memory, where it activates relevant schemes. Schemes are long-term 
stored templates for what to do in various contexts to achieve various results. Each scheme 
contains a context, an action, and a result. Each scheme also has a base-level activation 
which quantifies how reliably the scheme’s action leads to its expected result when taken 
within its context. Schemes can be, and often are, generalized templates that are then filled 
in and specified using the broadcast of conscious content. The binding of specific values 
from the conscious broadcast to a scheme’s variables is called instantiation, and schemes 
whose variables are bound in this way are called “instantiated schemes.” Instantiated 
schemes are also referred to as “behaviors,” and these are sent to Action Selection. In many 
situations, Action Selection may have multiple possible behaviors from which to choose. 
For example, when dealing with an approaching tennis ball, “volley,” “smash,” or “ground 
stroke” may all be possible actions that could be encoded in behaviors. 
Often a behavior stream is sent from Procedural Memory to Action Selection. The P-
intention that resulted in the instantiation of that behavior stream will likely be the result 
of the final behavior in the stream. For example, the proximal intention of "putting on that 
green shirt from the pile on the chair" can be used to instantiate a behavior stream 
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containing behaviors such as picking up the shirt, turning it the right way, putting the shirt 
over one's head, and sliding into the shirt. Each of these instantiated schemes can be sent 
to Action Selection in a stream so that they can compete to be chosen by Action Selection 
one by one. This process ensures that when an agent commits to an intention, they can still 
change their actions as the action is taking place should something change in the 
environment. For example, if an agent is in the midst of putting on the green shirt but 
realizes that there is a big hot sauce stain on the shirt, they do not have to continue putting 
on the shirt. The hot sauce stain has come to consciousness, and Procedural Memory has 
now sent Action Selection a new behavior that wins out the competition – namely, put the 
shirt back down. By having each behavior in a behavior stream compete in Action 
Selection, the agent can accommodate events that might change the proximal intention they 
are in the process of executing.  
Within Action Selection, the behavior that fits the current situation the best is selected 
and sent to Sensory Motor Memory. Much like the competition for consciousness in the 
Global Workspace, behaviors compete in Action Selection, before the winner is sent to 
Sensory Motor Memory. Sensory Motor Memory is composed of motor plan templates, 
one of which then becomes instantiated using the selected behavior [Dong & Franklin, 
2015]. The system creates a motor plan that most optimally fits the selected instantiated 
behavior. Once the behavior has been paired with a motor plan, the action is carried into 
fruition in Motor Plan Execution. The execution of the motor plan occurs while inputs from 
the dorsal stream create rapid, online updates facilitating the execution of the motor plan. 
For example, if an agent is catching a baseball, rapid dorsal stream updating bypassing the 
conscious cycle goes directly to motor plan execution to facilitate the smooth unfolding of 
the motor plan, enabling the ball to be caught effortlessly.  
To ensure coherence between our actions, once a behavior has been selected, a special 
short term attention codelet is generated to scan the Current Situational Model for the 
expected results or absence of results of that behavior. This attention codelet is called an 
expectation codelet, and it looks for structures in the CSM that are relevant to the expected 
result of the action to be executed. Expectation codelets (as with all attention codelets) look 
for structures matching their concerns. When such structures are found, the expectation 
codelets bring themselves and the structure to the coalition-forming process. These 
coalitions are then brought to the Global Workspace to compete for consciousness. 
Expectation codelets and other attention codelets can contribute to the total activation of a 
coalition making it more likely to win the competition for consciousness. In this way, 
coalitions that are related to the results of the agent’s actions tend to have slightly boosted 
activation when competing for consciousness in the Global Workspace.  
From the expectation codelet-forming process, we see that an agent’s behavior can 
generate some of the conditions of its future patterns of attention. This becomes particularly 
important when we look at the self-reinforcing role of distal intentions and narratives in 
relation to attention (Sec. 5.4). 
So far, we have seen that action selection and execution in LIDA is a multistep process 
that moves from the general choice of schemes, to more specific behaviors, to concrete 
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motor execution; a process that typically involves P-intentions and M-intentions. However, 
it is important to keep in mind that this process of action selection is typically mediated by 
consciousness, but is not itself conscious [Franklin & Baars, 2010].  
Furthermore, alarm events bypass the conscious broadcast altogether, and move 
straight from PAM with perhaps a stop at the CSM to Procedural Memory. This bypassing 
of the conscious broadcast explains why sometimes agents do not realize what they are 
doing in dangerous situations until after the fact. As an example, we can think about the 
experience of being cut off in traffic by a hazardous driver; only after hitting the brakes 
and turning the wheel does the driver typically become fully aware of what has just 
happened. Thus, in LIDA alarms are never conscious, but still intentional. That is, alarms 
are intentional because they still utilize Procedural Memory, Action Selection, and Sensory 
Motor Memory to create actions. In other word, alarms still generate P-intentions and M-
intentions. Finally, as previously mentioned automatized action selection is still being 
developed in LIDA but we suspect that these will also be intentional in the sense that they 
generate P-intentions and M-intentions.       
As we will see next, in the case of volition, the action selection process itself becomes 
more explicitly conscious. Furthermore, we are now ready to see how distal intentions, and 
self-narratives help facilitate the action selection process. As we will see, our personal 
narratives of “who we are,” and our distal intentions, are relevant both for consciously-
mediated action selection as well as for volitional action selection. 
 Volitional Action, Ideomotor Theory, and the Self Narrative    
Volitional decision making is often required of cognitive agents. While consciously-
mediated action selection is not itself conscious, volitional action selection often is partly 
conscious. Volitional decisions are those which require the agent to “mull over” or actively 
deliberate. Volitional decision making is often required in contexts in which the situation 
might not provide a clear-cut path of execution, the situation is completely novel, or 
perhaps two or more behaviors could seemingly achieve the desired goal equally well. 
When such situations occur, the LIDA model employs an updated ideomotor theory[James, 
2007; Shin et al., 2010]. However, as Bratman reminds us, in order to break everyday 
stalemate cases, we must be able to consult, within deliberation, a nested hierarchy of long- 
and short-term intentions [Bratman, 1987]. Distal intentions and narratives become 
important pieces in the dance between proposers and objectors of LIDA’s ideomotor 
process.  
Volitional action is characterized by an internal “debate” between proposers, 
supporters, and objectors. In LIDA, volitional decision making is partly conscious, and 
importantly takes place over multiple cycles. The process of deliberation begins as an 
option, question, dilemma, or novel, indeterminate situation comes to consciousness, 
calling for deliberation. As various instantiated schemes compete in Action Selection, the 
deliberation scheme must win the competition by having the most activation in order for 
deliberation to begin. Typically, this happens when no competing behaviors have high 
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activation, in routine cases such as looking at a restaurant menu, or when the agent must 
consider an internally generated proposal. When deliberation is selected, a special purpose 
processor, called a ‘timer,’ is created and sent to the Current Situational Model. The timer 
is crucial for volitional decision making because it ensures that there will be an end to the 
deliberation processes that might otherwise perseverate [Franklin, 2000].  
As the agent continues to perceive the situation, supporters, objectors, or new 
proposers can be created in the CSM. If no objection wins the competition for 
consciousness, and the timer runs out, the choice in question becomes the agent’s 
immediate goal, and a relevant behavior is selected by Action Selection. This instantiated 
scheme is then sent to Sensory Motor Memory for the selection of an appropriate motor 
plan, and the action is carried out by Motor Plan Execution.   
However, most deliberative processes include the back-and-forth between supporters 
and objectors. Thus, if an objector is generated and comes to consciousness, the timer is 
stopped. However, if a new supporter arises in consciousness, the timer is restarted, this 
time with less remaining time on it to ensure that eventually a decision will be made. In 
this way, as each supporter or objector or new proposer comes to consciousness, 
deliberation takes place over multiple cognitive cycles.     
During the deliberative process, special attention codelets are generated. Each of these 
new attention codelets scan the CSM for structures that are relevant to their concerns. The 
attention codelets scan for structures that can function as objections or supports for the 
decision being deliberated. In this way, the concerns of the new attention codelets are 
directly tied to the decision the agent is mulling over. For example, a novice agent is 
playing chess and is considering whether or not to move their knight. Having spent some 
time with an instructor the agent has been taught the maxim “having a knight on the rim is 
grim.” Learning the maxim will result in the creation of an attention codelet whose concern 
is knights on the edge of the board. This codelet will bring the agent’s attention to the fact 
that knights are less effective when placed on the sides of the board. This concern could 
come to consciousness as an objection as part of the deliberation process.  
During deliberation, with the generation of special attention codelets, the agent can 
simultaneously generate special structure building codelets. Any new structure building 
codelets in addition to any previously learned structure building codelets can build 
structures in the CSM relevant for supporters and objectors. Further, these structure 
building codelets can also build new proposals, that the agent can consider should they 
come to consciousness. Here the relevant structures that structure building codelets utilize 
include, but are not limited to, relevant snippets of the agent’s self-narrative and distal 
intentions. During deliberation, structure building codelets build possible objectors and 
supporters, and attention codelets try to bring these structures to consciousness.        
For example, an agent receives an email from a toy company stating that their son’s 
favorite action figure is back in stock. An option is generated in the Current Situational 
Model, wins the competition for consciousness and is broadcast to Procedural Memory 
among many others. Several behavioral streams are instantiated, one being “click-on-link-
and-buy,” another “deliberate.” Here the “deliberate” behavior is a deliberation scheme 
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instantiated to deliberate with the option to click-and-buy as a proposer. In this example, 
the deliberation behavior wins the competition in Action Selection. As the agent begins the 
deliberation process, relevant portions of their narrative and distal intentions are cued into 
the CSM, where structure building codelets use them to make objectors and supporters, 
and attention codelets bring coalitions including those to the Global Workspace. In this 
case, a portion of the agent’s self-narrative, “I want to be a loving parent, because my own 
parents where stern and cold,” becomes a support structure and wins the competition for 
consciousness.    
However, during the very next broadcast (before the timer runs out), structure building 
codelets find distal intentions set by the agent to not support companies who use 
exploitative labor practices. This distal intention is further connected to the parts of the 
agent’s narrative that cast them as someone who wants to be a better example for their son 
than was their own father. In this case, the narrative segment to be the kind of person that 
will not purchase from exploitative corporations may be built into an objector by structure 
building codelets, and may win the competition for consciousness. If the objector wins its 
way to consciousness, then the running timer would be stopped, and the option to purchase 
the toy would no longer be a live option for the agent.  
Importantly, in the LIDA model, when the ideomotor process converges on a decision, 
the option the process decides on is transformed into a goal for the agent. As mentioned at 
the beginning of the paper, we here use ‘goal’ and ‘intention’ synonymously. Intentions 
are generated at the end of the ideomotor process. Furthermore, as the option is transformed 
into an intention, the system also generates an intention codelet (a type of attention codelet 
looking for structures relevant to the intention). This becomes significant later as we 
elucidate how distal intentions bias agential action (Sec. 5.3). However, first we must look 
at how the self-narrative involved in the ideomotor process comes about. 
 Narratives and Distal Intentions in LIDA 
 The Narrative Templates and How They Are Generated 
We have seen that narratives and narrative snippets can function as objectors and 
supporters in the ideomotor process and that this role may help steer the agent’s behavior. 
Next, we will see how narratives are generated within the agent, through the ongoing 
cognitive cycles. 
With each cognitive cycle, Transient Episodic Memory (TEM) typically updates itself 
with content from the conscious broadcast. Undecayed contents in TEM are periodically 
consolidated into Declarative Memory. TEM functions as a long-term working memory 
storing information that is relevant on a fairly short time scale. Longer-term relevant 
information is consolidated from TEM to Declarative Memory, as either an 
autobiographical or semantic memory. Here, ‘autobiographical’ refers to episodes that are 
stored as occurrences that specifically happen to the agent. In contrast, semantic memory 
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is stored as general information without specifics, such as "when" and "where." In many 
complex agents there is a difference between autobiographical memories and semantic 
memories. However, until now this distinction has only been implemented in a few LIDA 
agents.  
In more complex LIDA agents, a self-narrative is slowly generated and updated as 
information is consolidated into Autobiographical Memory. As agents deliberate, they 
often cue autobiographical memories from Declarative Memory into the Current 
Situational Model where they can help act as supporters or objectors in the deliberation 
process. If a particular memory or set of memories gets cued frequently to aid in the 
deliberation process, those memories can begin to stand out as important parts of the agent's 
self-identity. Each time the memory is part of a conscious broadcast, either as an objector, 
supporter, or simply being remembered, that memory gains added base-level activation as 
it is re-updated into Transient Episodic Memory. In other words, the more times a specific 
memory is broadcast, the higher its base level activation will be, and the more important it 
becomes in the agent's self-narrative.  
Through this process, a set of memories in Declarative Memory begins to emerge as 
the agent's self-narrative. These high-salience memories are, in turn, organized in a causal 
pattern (a causal story) within Declarative Memory. While stories come in a variety of 
types, the kind of story that constitutes a self-narrative is the kind that can explain the 
causal connections between events over longer time scales. Causal stories connect 
important events despite those events being temporally distant [Nelson & Fivush, 2020]. 
For example, graduating college, getting a Ph.D., and being sent to the International Space 
Station are typically temporally distant events that can be organized in a causal order 
without having to list all the actions and events in between them. As specific memories 
gain an increase in base-level activation, those memories can get chained together in a self-
narrative that forms a causal story within Declarative Memory.   
However, merely gaining an increase in base-level activation does not explain how 
memories get causally chained together. The chaining together of salient memories takes 
place across multiple cognitive cycles, and is dependent on the Conscious Contents Queue 
and narrative templates. Human agents are frequently exposed to narratives. Through 
fiction, folklore, TV, movies, songs, dance, plays, video games, and through many other 
cultural and interpersonal means, humans are presented with narratives on how to act in 
various situations and across slow and fast time scales. These socially- and culturally-
transmitted narratives can function as templates for the agent to structure their own life 
story, their self-narrative [Bruner, 1991; 2004]. As Bruner aptly reminds us, quoting Oscar 
Wilde, life often imitates art [Bruner, 2004, p. 692]. Furthermore, from early infancy, 
human agents frequently interact with their caretakers through narrative interaction 
[Delafield-Butt & Trevarthen, 2015]c. Culturally and socially transmitted narratives 
become templates that aid agents in organizing their experiences into self-narratives 
 
c Narratives are so pervasive in human culture and social development that some authors argue narrative 
competency plays a critical role in the development of theory of mind [Gallagher & Hutto, 2008; Hutto, 2008]. 
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[Nelson & Fivush, 2020]. Without such templates, making sense of oneself and the world 
on longer time scale, involving extended periods of time over months and years, would 
become increasingly difficult for the agent.    
Whether through interaction with culture, media, or other agents, human agents are 
presented with a myriad of narratives. Over time, such narratives are consolidated from 
TEM to Declarative Memory. As the agent continues to engage with the world, these 
narratives often begin to lose their specificity (who, where, when, and why?) over the 
course of many cognitive cycles. This loss of specificity typically happens as some of the 
details decay away over long periods of time. In some instances, the details are no longer 
relevant and simply decay away from the semantic information. In other instances, new 
memories containing the same semantic information interfere with time and place details 
of the original memory. For example, if an agent is told by Fred that Nashville is the state 
capital of Tennessee, they might over time forget that Fred had told them so, while still 
remember the fact about Nashville. As the information about Nashville is presented in other 
situations the semantic knowledge is reinforced while the original details (who, where, and 
when) are interfered with. The agent can no longer remember where they learned the 
semantic knowledge (which originally came from Fred); they simply remember the 
reinforced semantic knowledge (Nashville is the state capital of TN). In a similar fashion, 
agents often learn specific detailed narratives from their cultures. However, as the details 
Fig. 4. Culturally transmitted narratives can become part of coalitions that might win the competition to be 
broadcast. The green figures represent the typical trajectory a narrative might take through the model. Blue 
arrows represent potential cuing of data structures or updating. Structure Building Codelets scan the CSM and 
Conscious Content Queue to build structures, while attention codelets bring structures to the coalition forming 
process and the Global Workspace. Narratives are often broadcast, stored in Transient Episodic Memory, and 
later consolidated into Declarative Memory. Over many cognitive cycles narratives can become reinforced and 
generalized thereby taking the form of a narrative template. 
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decay away, what typically remains is a culturally-transmitted, generalized narrative 
template [Freeman, 2007].  
In LIDA, the process of turning culturally-transmitted narratives into narrative 
templates happens through multiple cognitive cycles (see Fig. 4). Memories that have lost 
some or all their specificity are frequently cued into the Current Situational Model (for 
example, if the agent encounters something in the environment that reminds them of those 
narrative memories). If more than one culturally-transmitted narrative memory is cued into 
the CSM at the same time, structure building codelets can begin to form those memories 
into a complex structure. A subset of structure building codelets look specifically for 
similarity in narrative structure for the purpose of narrative template creation. We must 
remember that codelets are special-purpose processors that scan the CSM only for things 
related to their one concern, in this case the creation of narrative templates. As structure 
building codelets find sufficiently similar cued up narratives in the CSM, they begin to 
form these into narrative templates. Specifically, the structure building codelets are 
generalizing over the narratives, to create a general template in which the specific details 
of the narrative are now substitutable place holders (variables). For example, with enough 
narratives such as “Mario saves Princess Peach”, “Spiderman saves Mary-Jane”, “Solid 
Snake saves Meryl” an agent can generalize the (gendered and often harmful) template 
male-agent-saves-helpless-female. Through contact with enough similar narratives, 
structure building codelets can create a variety of generalized templates with unbound 
placeholders.     
If a narrative template is created by structure building codelets, it can become part of 
a coalition that potentially wins the competition for the conscious broadcast. If the template 
is part of the content being broadcast, it typically enters TEM and is typically consolidated 
into Declarative Memory. However, if the broadcasted narrative template is similar enough 
to a template that already exists in Declarative Memory, then Declarative Memory might 
simply update the base-level activation of its preexisting narrative template. Learning has 
occurred. 
Furthermore, already existing narrative templates can be adjusted, fleshed out, or 
changed in other ways as the agent comes in contact with new, similar, culturally-
transmitted narratives. If a narrative template is cued into the CSM together with a new 
narrative memory, structure building codelets can once again do their work and compare 
the new narrative to existing templates. If the new narrative fits the template, the structure 
building codelet often will attach it to the narrative template. If this augmented structure is 
broadcast, it can make it back into TEM. In this way, over many cognitive cycles agents 
can gain and augment narrative templates. Learning has occurred.       
Over time, as agents are exposed to enough narratives, specific templates begin to 
emerge as they are repeatedly reinforced through the cognitive cycles. In human agents, 
culturally transmitted narrative templates have been shown to reproduce aspects of self-
concept and self-narratives related to race [Collins, 2002], gender [Grysman et al., 2016; 
McLean et al., 2020], sexuality [Compton, 2020], and national identity [Lae, 2019]. 
Furthermore, it has been argued that humans use narrative templates to generate the 
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narrative self through self-directed subvocalization of culturally transmitted narratives. In 
other words, through internal speech as a form of self-stimulation, humans retell narratives 
originally about others now about themselves [Dennett, 2017]. In this way, culturally 
transmitted narratives can slowly be transformed into templates that the agent exploits to 
organize and understand its own experiences. For example, through movies, books, and 
TV, the narrative of the reluctant hero can become a narrative template for agents to utilize 
when organizing their experiences. Broad cultural phenomena such as Harry Potter, Star 
Wars, and Spider-Man all reinforce the reluctant hero narrative. Over time, some human 
agents might use the basic structure of such stories to evaluate and organize their own 
experiences. For example, through careful analysis of decades of life stories, McAdams 
[2006]  identifies culturally transmitted templates (or master narratives) that are pervasive 
in the United States – the underdog, rags to riches, heroism through redemption. Agents 
organize their experiences to fit the mold provided to them through cultural immersion.    
Often, the stories from which agents acquire their narrative templates are far removed 
from the situations to which the templates are applied. For example, a high-school student 
gets nominated to be the student representative on the school board. While the student has 
no desire to be on the board and represent the student body at awkward meetings with 
teachers, the student might understand that they were chosen to do so. Due to their previous 
display of excellent public speaking skills, the student is (supposedly) the only one who 
can do this, the “chosen one.” Even when the original story from which the template was 
generated is far removed from the situation at hand, agents may nonetheless organize their 
experiences to fit them.  
 Chaining Together Salient Memories and Templates into Self-
Narratives  
At this point, we have two critical pieces of the puzzle: through repeated broadcasts, 
important life memories gain an increase in base-level activation, and through repeated 
exposure and memory consolidation, the agent stores narrative templates in Declarative 
Memory. Next, we will see how memories and narrative templates are chained together to 
form the agent's self-narrative (for an overview, see Fig. 5).  
 In many different situations (whether in deliberation or some other cognitive task), 
salient memories might be cued into the Current Situational Model. Furthermore, often 
when an agent perceives a situation, that situation might cue up a narrative template from 
Declarative Memory. For example, an agent might see their friend struggle with and make 
a hard decision in a moral dilemma (should they or should they not report their colleague 
to the dean for questionable use of university funds). As the agent talks the case over with 
their friend, the perceived situation cues up a narrative template that has similar 
components to the situation of the agent's friend. If the narrative template becomes part of 
a coalition that wins the competition for the conscious broadcast, the narrative template is 
temporarily stored in the Conscious Contents Queue. Additionally, as the agent perceives 
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their friend lamenting over the problematic moral dilemma, salient memories from their 
past become part of coalitions that win the competition and are broadcast.  
In this example, salient life memories and narrative templates are now present in the 
Conscious Contents Queue (and possibly in the CSM). This allows structure building 
codelets to stitch the template and the memories together into one combined structure in 
the CSM. If this structure (templates plus memories) becomes part of a coalition that wins 
the competition for broadcasting, the narratively-organized structure is broadcast 
throughout the system. Consequently, the contents of this broadcast, the narratively-
organized structure, can be stored in TEM. Later, as TEM consolidates its content into 
Declarative Memory, the narratively-organized memories can be stored within Declarative 
Memory. Through this repeated process, across many cycles (sometimes this can take 
decades in humans), narrative segments become chained together with other narrative 
segments slowly forming a full causal story. To summarize, as memories and narrative 
templates in the Conscious Contents Queue and the CSM are chained together by structure 
building codelets, they gain the chance of becoming part of coalitions that can be broadcast 
(see Fig. 5 and Fig. 6). If they are broadcast, the narratively-organized memories can be 
stored and consolidated back into Declarative Memory, where a coherent story is slowly 
forming. 
 
Fig. 5. As we see here the trajectory taken by narratively organized memories is very similar to the trajectory 
taken by narrative templates. The green figures represent the typical trajectory of stitched-together memory 
chains. Blue arrows represent possible cuing of data structures or updating. Chains of already narratively-
organized memories can be stitched together with salient memories or other chains of memory by structure 
building codelets. Memory chains already in the CSM or in the Conscious Contents Queue can become part of 
coalitions and might win the competition for broadcasting. If broadcast, the new coalition can be stored into TEM 
and later consolidated to Declarative Memory. 
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The narrativizing process just described can, over time, be repeated, chaining together 
already narratively-organized memories into larger narratives. A similar process to that 
responsible for organizing salient memories into narrative form is typically also responsible 
for taking each of those narratives, chaining them together into a larger narrative. By 
having templates and narratively-organized memories called into the CSM, structure 
building codelets can stitch together even larger narratives that can be broadcast and stored 
in the agent’s memory systems. Painting with broad strokes, we see that a self-narrative 
can be generated through repeated stitching, broadcasting, and memory storing over many 
cognitive cycles (see Fig. 5 and Fig. 6). In this way we see that the process of creating 
narrative templates and the process of chaining together self-narratives are in many 
respects very similar. 
It is pertinent to point out that as the self-narrative grows through repeated stitching, 
chaining, and organizing, it eventually becomes too large for the entire narrative to be 
broadcast. Thus, it is highly unlikely that agents over a certain complexity and age can ever 
be consciously “aware” of their entire narrative. Rather, it is more likely that the system 
generates a form of “outline” or “synopsis” of its own self-narrative that can then be 
utilized in various processes. Such outlines can represent the whole narrative or sections of 
it. These outlines are represented in the CSM in the form of a narrative node structure. 
Similarly, in many cases some of the narrative templates become too large for the system 
to broadcast the template in its entirety. In those cases, the template becomes represented 
in the system as a synopsis narrative template node structure. In the same fashion such 
node structures comprise a summary representation of the full template but are not 
themselves the full template. In this way neither the agents overarching self-narrative nor 
its narrative templates put too heavy of a computational burden on the agent, since the 
agent does not have to hold the entirety of large templates or its entire self-narrative in the 
CSM.  
While episodic memories have to go through TEM before they can get consolidated 
into Declarative Memory, already-existing narrative memories inside Declarative Memory 
can have their base-level activation directly updated using contents from the conscious 
broadcast. Say a portion of an agent’s self-narrative becomes part of a coalition that wins 
the competition for consciousness.  The contents of that coalition are broadcast to the 
agent’s various modules. Declarative Memory can use the broadcasted portion of the self-
narrative to update the base-level activation of that corresponding portion inside 
Declarative Memory. In this way, even if elements of an agent’s self-narrative are not 
rearranged or changed, the self-narrative can still be modified through the updating of base-
level activation (Remember that base-level activation of that portion of the self-narrative 
as a structure in the CSM is one component of the coalition activation, which determines 
which coalition wins the competition for consciousness).                  
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While simple agents might have a preprogrammed agenda, more complex agents such 
as humans have a more "existential" sense of who they are. That is, besides their basic 
biologically determined agenda (e.g., nutrition, survival, procreation), complex agents 
develop specific agendas containing, amongst other things, life goals. Wanting to be a great 
painter or living life my way can, of course, in some reductive fashion be traced back to an 
agent's simple biological agenda. However, more specific life goals emerge in complex 
agents from the development of a self-narrative. In LIDA, the agent's agenda is guided by 
the perpetual subtle reorganizing of the self-narrative in Declarative Memory. However, 
we wish to stress again that in concert with the pattern theory of the self, the self-narrative 
is far from the only aspect of what it means for the agent to have a self [Ryan et al., 2019]. 
Nevertheless, organizing salient memories into a causal narrative provides the agent with 
a temporal sense of who it is in the world, and what the agent ought to do. 
As deliberation is initiated, portions of the self-narrative can be cued up from 
Declarative Memory into the CSM, where structure building codelets can use them to build 
objectors, supporters, or proposers. However, not every decision in need of deliberation 
needs to invoke the self-narrative. Many everyday choices simply utilize concerns 
embedded in the current situation in order to end the deliberation process. A human agent 
Fig. 6. Here we see an example of content temporally aligned within the Conscious Contents Queue. Since 
memories and templates are both in the queue, they are available for structure building codelets to bring them into 
the CSM to become part of structures. In this case, the memories will be organized into narrative form using the 
available template 
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may deliberate briefly about which of two varieties of jam to spread on the toast. However, 
self-narratives still structure the daily, environmentally embedded actions of the agent 
through distal intentions and the updating of incentive salience. We must remember that 
many of an agent’s distal intentions often stem from the agent's self-narrative and self-
concept. Next, we will look at the role of distal intentions and how distal intentions 
structure action. 
 Setting a Distal Intention in LIDA  
As mentioned at the beginning, in the LIDA literature we have in the past talked about 
options and goals (Sec. 1 and 4.2). However, here we use the term ‘intention’ to stay in 
communication with the literature from cognitive science and action theory. We use the 
terms ‘intention’ and ‘goal’ synonymously. We have seen how narratives are generated 
and how they play a causal role in long term agential behavior. Next, we will look at distal 
intentions in more detail to elucidate their role in the hierarchy of long-term agential action. 
In LIDA there are multiple ways an agent can set and commit to distal intentions. In this 
paper we focus on setting distal intentions both with and without deliberation. 
First let us look at how an agent can set a distal intention through deliberation. Often, 
an agent will generate an option in response to its environment. (Recall that an option is a 
virtual event representing a possible choice.) Frequently, if the option comes to 
consciousness, the ideomotor processes is initiated, making the agent deliberate between 
whether to act on the option, on some other option, or perhaps not at all (Sec. 4.4). If the 
option is in fact selected at the end of the ideomotor process, that option is transformed 
into a goal for the agent – an intention. Thus, if an option comes to consciousness, and a 
resulting behavior is selected through the Action Selection process and executed, that 
option, as its result, will be transformed into a goal [Franklin et al., 2016, Sec. 6.2]. 
However, not all goals can be immediately fulfilled; some goals are in the distant future 
(e.g., getting a Ph.D., proposing to Sally next year, collecting and assembling all of the 
1990 LEGO Castles collection). Distal intentions are goals for the agent that cannot be 
immediately fulfilled. However, since the goal cannot be immediately fulfilled, the distal 
intention (through the conscious broadcast) usually ends up being stored in the agent’s 
memory systems. For example, it could be stored in TEM and then potentially consolidated 
into Declarative Memory if it does not decay away first. Once stored in the agent’s memory 
system the distal intention can affect the agent’s behavior through a number of mechanisms 
(that we will cover in subsequent sections). 
Since the distal intention generated at the end of the ideomotor theory is not 
immediately actionable, it must be “committed to” as something that will be done later. 
Thus, if an agent decides on an option at the end of the ideomotor process, and that option 
is part of the conscious broadcast, then based on the option Procedural Memory can 
instantiate a “commitment” scheme into a commitment behavior. Both the commitment 
scheme and its commitment behavior contain an internal action. Unlike external actions 
that modify the agent’s external environment, internal actions can initiate internal 
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processes that can operate within the CSM. If the commitment behavior wins the 
competition amongst behaviors in Action Selection, the result of its internal action in the 
CSM is a representation of the committed-to distal intention. If that distal intention 
becomes part of a coalition that wins the competition for consciousness the distal intention 
is broadcast throughout the system. This means that the agent’s memory systems can now 
store the committed-to distal intention. Thus, deliberating, and then committing to a distal 
intention is a multicyclic process.    
However, many distal intentions do not require the ideomotor process. In other words, 
agents often set distal intentions without the need to mull over the option. For example, if 
an agent opens the refrigerator and sees that it is near empty, the option to go to the store 
tomorrow morning, might come to consciousness. In that case the agent does not need to 
carefully deliberate over whether or not to go to the store. That intention can be generated 
as an option in the CSM by structure building codelets. As we shall see, committing to a 
distal intention without the ideomotor process in LIDA is very similar to committing to 
one with the ideomotor process. Namely, in LIDA committing to a distal intention without 
the ideomotor process happens through the use of the same “commitment” internal action. 
As in the previous case, if a distal intention comes to consciousness (for example go 
to the store tomorrow), Procedural Memory can use that distal intention to instantiate a 
commitment scheme and send the resulting commitment behavior to Action Selection. If 
that commitment behavior wins the competition in Action Selection, the agent performs an 
internal action. This action is a commitment action, as in the deliberative case. The result 
of the commitment action is a representation of the committed-to distal intention in the 
CSM. If this commitment representation becomes part of a coalition that wins the 
competition for consciousness, then the content of the coalition will be broadcast, including 
the committed-to intention. The commitment to the distal intention is thus broadcast and 
sent throughout the model, where it can be picked up by the agent’s memory modules. 
Once the distal intention has been stored in the agent’s memory modules it can begin 
having an impact on the agent’s behavior.  
We see then that it typically takes several cognitive cycles for an agent to commit to a 
distal intention even without deliberation. First an option must become part of a 
commitment behavior and then the resulting committed-to representation of the distal 
intention must be part of a coalition that wins the competition for consciousness. Setting 
distal intentions is always a multicyclic endeavor. Importantly, setting a distal intention 
involves the agent committing itself to the distal intention so that the intention can guide 
their behavior going forward. Next, we will look at various processes that help guide 
behavior once a distal intention has been set 
 Distal Intentions and Attentional Processes  
Once a distal intention has been created, typically at the end of the ideomotor process or 
through an internal commitment behavior, new structure building codelets and attention 
codelets are often generated. The concern of these codelets is, respectively, to build 
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structures in the CSM relevant to the distal intention, and to bring such structures to the 
Global Workspace to compete for consciousness. Specifically, intention codelets are a 
subset of attention codelets that look for structures in the CSM relevant to an agent’s 
intentions [Franklin et al., 2016, Sec. 5.4]. When an agent intends to do something over a 
distal time scale, the process typically involves biasing its own attentional processes 
towards the aim of the distal intention. Consequently, it is an important feature of intention 
codelets that they decay away at a slow rate. Thus, intention codelets can stay within the 
system over long time scales, continually scanning the CSM for structures related to the 
distal intention.  
All attention codelets have a base-level activation that can be reinforced during a 
cognitive cycle. Attention codelets are reinforced in accordance with how successful they 
are at bringing structures to consciousness. If an attention codelet’s base-level activation 
falls under the minimum threshold, the codelet is deleted. Intention codelets can stay in the 
system if they are successful at bringing structures to consciousness and are thereby 
reinforced.   
The lingering of intention codelets explains how an agent can go about its day, see 
something, and, seemingly out of the blue, be reminded of one of their distal intentions 
[Baars et al., 2007]. Intention codelets related to distal intentions typically are reinforced 
and don’t decay away quickly. When an agent encounters objects and situations related to 
a distal intention, options related to that distal intention are more likely to come to 
consciousness. This is so even if the agent has not thought about, or done anything related 
to, the distal intention for a while. Because of the existence of a distal intention, for 
example, the desire to become an excellent journalist, an agent’s attentional processes are 
biased towards things related to the achievement of that distal intention. This process may 
include the generation of new attention codelets, such as an intention codelet (see Fig. 7). 
For example, by meeting other inspirational people, a preconscious thought about the 
possibility of becoming an excellent journalist might be generated in an agent’s 
preconscious Workspace. If this possibility wins the competition for consciousness and is 
broadcast, the possibility can be stored in the agent’s memory systems, and may eventually 
begin to generate codelets. These newly-generated attention codelets may now lead the 
agent to see actions, events, and options related to the distal intention of becoming a 
journalist. 
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However, it is crucial to understand that many processes in LIDA do not have a single 
cause. Similarly, while distal intentions often aid in the generation of new codelets relevant 
to their concerns, many other processes can also generate new attention and structure 
building codelets. For example, actively learning of a new skill, a new academic literature, 
a new language, board games, or even how to interact with specific agents such as friends 
and family, can all generate new codelets. Often, the generation of new attention and 
structure building codelets happens to come from situations that are already in accordance 
with the aims of distal intentions [Baars et al., 2007]. Thus, while having a distal intention 
in itself can generate some new codelets, many other processes related to the distal 
intention also bring about new codelets. For example, pursuing journalism as a major in 
college means taking classes on writing and investigation, which involves skills that lead 
to the generation of both new sub-intentions and new codelets. Finally, it is worth noting 
that while there is a technical story to be told of how new codelets are generated in LIDA, 
(using amongst other things the Slipnet from the Copycat Architecture [Hofstadter & 
Mitchell, 1995], that story is outside the scope of this paper. 
Fig. 7. As distal intentions are created through the ideomotor process - their existence  will often prompt the 
system to generate new attention codelets—specifically, an intention codelet for each new distal intention. These 
codelets will bring distal intention-relevant structures to compete for consciousness. Intention codelets related to 
distal intentions decay away at a slow rate, ensuring that the agent can bring structures to consciousness related 
to their distal intentions even over slow time scales. 
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While in many cases an agent already has all the attention and structure building 
codelets needed, novel possibilities that the agent has never considered typically require 
the generation of new codelets. For example, when setting the distal intention to learn how 
to paint human faces, the novice must generate new attention codelets and structure 
building codelets that are relevant to the proportions of human facial anatomy. For 
example, through practice and learning, the novice painter generates attention codelets that 
scan for subtleties in the ratios of human facial features. Looking for such subtleties was 
not something the agent engaged in before the generation of the appropriate attention 
codelets. Setting or gaining a distal intention often involves generating new attention 
codelets for the fulfillment of the distal intention. 
Another common example is learning how to play games. When an agent learns how 
to play a game such as tic-tac-toe or chess, it is introduced to new pieces, rules, movements, 
and board positions. Being able to play chess entails understanding the pieces and the 
significance of their positioning. Learning to play chess is not only to internalize the rules 
of the game, but also to generate new structure building codelets that are relevant to the 
game of chess. Developing the distal intention to one day be better at chess than World 
Champion Magnus Carlsen includes the generation of structure building codelets relevant 
to chess, and attention codelets relevant to advantageous and disadvantageous board states.         
However, gaining a distal intention only once is typically not strong enough to play 
the conduct-controlling role described above. As the agent goes through events in the 
world, it might recreate the distal intention as a live possibility in the CSM. Each time the 
distal intention presents itself and is broadcast, the distal intention in Declarative Memory 
can be strengthened through an increase in base-level activation. For example, in the case 
of the agent who realized it could be a journalist, perceiving that possibility once is not 
enough. Rather, the agent might see journalists in TV shows, fiction, movies, educational 
advertisement, parental support, and peer suggestions. With each broadcast of individuals 
who are journalists, the distal intention may gain more base-level activation to the point 
where it might begin to outweigh other considerations when the agent is deliberating its 
choices. 
However, gaining an increase in base-level activation is typically not enough for a 
distal intention to guide an agent’s conduct. As an agent learns more about what is entailed 
by their distal intention, new attention codelets are created. In our journalist example, the 
agent might only have a vague idea of what is actually entailed in being a journalist. 
However, as the agent learns more about the job, new attention codelets are generated that 
scan the CSM for things relevant to the new expanded concept of journalist and the 
expanded distal intention of becoming a journalist. As agents pursue their distal intentions, 
they typically learn more about those intentions, which in turn provide the agent with more 
relevant things to pay attention to with regards to the distal intention. 
In this manner, distal intentions are often slowly self-reinforcing. As distal intentions 
are fleshed out, more relevant attention codelets can be generated. When those attention 
codelets bring coalitions to consciousness that are related to the distal intention, the base-
level activation of the distal intention may be updated, thereby making it more likely that 
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the distal intention will win the competition for consciousness in the future. In this way, 
when successful in guiding behavior, distal intentions slowly reinforce themselves through 
a feedback loop of attention and action. 
 Distal Intentions and Incentive Salience Affect Attention and Action 
Selection  
As shown in the overview (Sec. 3) and illustrated in Fig. 2, there is a hierarchical nature to 
agential action. However, agential action is not always a top-down process starting with 
the narrative. While the ideomotor process of deliberation often directly consults the self-
narrative, usually the causal power of the narrative is expressed implicitly through distal 
intentions.  Those distal intentions, in turn, aid in the updating of incentive salience.  
When a distal intention is stored, each broadcast of a structure that relates to the 
obtaining of the aim of that distal intention typically results in a positive increase in the 
structure’s base-level incentive salience. Through a history of interaction with events that 
are related to the aim of the distal intention, the agent builds up a wanting for events that 
bring it closer to the aim of the distal intention.  
For example, an agent might enjoy sweet things and have repeated experiences of 
eating cakes. Cakes can then become associated with the liking of sweet things and the 
desire for cake can slowly emerge. In LIDA, the liking is quantified through affective 
valence and the desiring through incentive salience.    
Events that lead to the obtaining of the distal intention can develop incentive salience. 
If a distal intention has positive incentive salience, and the agent engages with events that 
are causally related to the attainment of that distal intention, then that event usually also 
has positive incentive salience. For example, to get a PhD, students need to take a 
comprehensive exam. That exam may not be inherently likeable, but it may gain incentive 
salience due to its association with the larger goal of getting a PhD. Similarly, through 
interaction with events that are related to the distal intention, but are obstacles for the agent, 
the system might decrease the incentive salience of such structures. Therefore, the base-
level incentive salience of relevant structures can be increased or decreased with the 
broadcast of events that relate to the fulfilment of the distal intention.  
 We see then, that making a self-commitment often means that relevant actions become 
more salient to the agent. LIDA agents attune themselves to be more incentivized by 
options, events, and actions that are related to their long-term goals. While commitments 
are often not conscious, the conscious broadcast plays a role in shaping the degree of our 
commitments. Being committed to the aim of a distal intention often results in having 
structures related to the intention slowly gain more incentive salience over multiple 
cognitive cycles.d  
For example, let us say our aspiring journalist works for their college newspaper. The 
agent writes an article, and receives positive feedback from the editor. The agent likes 
 
d For more details regarding motivational processes in LIDA see [McCall et al., 2020] 
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gaining positive feedback, which increases the incentive salience associated with article 
writing. Over time, as the agent receives praise from colleagues and friends, the incentive 
salience of structures related to article writing is increased. Put simply, over time, liking 
translates into wanting, and wanting something will increase its likelihood of coming to 
consciousness. As article writing activities gain an increase in salience, this increases the 
likelihood that the agent will choose these activities over other activities when possible. 
We see then that there is a relationship between distal intentions and the choice of an 
agent’s day-to-day activities.  
 Summary and Concluding Remarks. 
We have looked at the overarching nested structure of narratives and intentions that enable 
coherent agential action. We have demonstrated how narratives and distal intentions can 
be generated through cognitive cycles including functional consciousness. Importantly, we 
have shown how the cohesive hierarchical structure of narratives and intentions can impact 
an agent’s processes across various time scales, thereby indirectly steering behavior. 
Further, rather than D, P, and M intentions being discrete items in the mind we have shown 
how we can coherently implement these into autonomous agents as processes. Long term 
coherent agential action is an achievement that emerges from the distribution of intention 
related processes across various time scales. Attention, self-understanding, self-narration, 
conscious learning, affect, memory, perception, and other processes are all, in one way or 
another, involved in creating the structure of agential action. If we want to understand 
coherent agential action, we cannot create explanations that are divorced from the 
functionality of consciousness. Coherent agential action is deeply integrated into the 
cognitive cycle, including consciousness. 
Implementing agential action into a cognitive architecture in this fashion allows for 
future research possibilities. For example, we believe that this agential model may be able 
to explain philosophical puzzles regarding indecision, akrasia (weakness of will), free will, 
and provide insight into some of the action related symptoms of psychopathologies such 
as depression. We suspect that we can model psychopathologies such as depression by 
looking at the interplay between narratives, distal intentions, incentive salience, affect, and 
how such processes might go awry. Finally, understanding the relationship between 
narratives, distal intentions, and daily actions, might provide further input into the growing 
discussions regarding AI ethics [Madl & Franklin, 2015; Wallach et al., 2011].     
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